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ARTICLE

Editing Military History in the
Twenty-First Century
Edward G. Lengel

(J1;/ ilitary historians are not usually accused of worrying about trendi-
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ness. More typically they seem like stodgy traditionalists, scoffing
at postrnodernism and its various spin-offs and fantasizing about putting
Foucault in the path of a cannonball at Gettysburg and shouting,
"Deconstruct this!" At academic conferences and in university departments,
military historians are outsiders: stubbornly following tales of great battles
and dead white males while their presumably more "relevant" colleagues
don red berets and scribble manifestoes in smoke-filled rooms.
Documentary editors who work in military history are, if anything, doubly
outsiders: fearing either to venture into social history, or to join traditional
scholars in interpreting source material by writing articles and monographs.
Yet times are changing. Among military historians, one of the hottest topics nowadays is the "social history of warfare." This blanket term covers:
studies of the behavior of men in battle; examinations of trends in wartime
societies via statistics; research in newspapers, letters, and diaries on propaganda and popular perceptions, as well as feisty postrnodernist tracts that
deconstruct warfare, "dismember the male," and tell us that World War II
didn't really exist. Study of these topics has completely changed the way
scholars understand the history of warfare. A further step in the transformation of military historical scholarship, the integration of documentary editing
into the mainstream scholarly endeavor, will come when documentary editors wake up to realize that they are not just "blue-collar academics"-a term
that makes them seem like glorified office drones-but historians too. With
that realization will come the understanding that they are historians with
especially valuable training and tools of a sort that qualify them to understand and explain their topics better than many other scholars.
As the profession of documentary editing evolves in the twenty-first century and new, streamlined projects appear that take full advantage of the new
technology, it becomes increasingly clear that documentary editors can no
longer remain content in their dreary little corners full of brown envelopes
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and dog-eared old genealogy volumes. No longer, it seems, should the life of
a documentary editor consist solely of plodding along through manuscripts
day after day, ruining backs and eyes, suffering through those white-knuckle
moments when an i looks like an e or a c, and worrying about whether
Private Smith was born in 1742 or 1743, while the "real" historians do all the
interpreting and writing. Until recently, most documentary editors have
served as obedient handmaids to history, dutifully preparing source materials for professional historians to use and interpret and then going into raptures when their hard work gets mentioned by Joe Ellis or David
McCullough in the acknowledgements to their latest book. Few of us have
been willing to consider that we might be historians and-horrors!-write
books and articles too. Yet the truth is that a documentary editor can also be
a scholar and a historian-well-read, interested in and aware of research and
trends in his or her field, and producing not just edited volumes but also
research and narrative writing.
In the old days, before the great documentary editing projects of the late
twentieth century began arranging and transcribing the papers of great historical figures, the question of whether a documentary editor could also be a
historian, or vice versa, was not subject to debate. Scholars writing biographies of great leaders and generals like Wellington, Napoleon, or Grant often
spent years arranging and cataloguing their subject's private papers while
perusing the material for their own work. For these historians, a collection of
papers was a resource to be mined selectively. The book, or narrative, naturally came first, and papers that had no apparent relevance to that projectroutine reports on supplies, returns, and other administrative materials, as
well as letters unrelated to great campaigns and battles- were often ignored.
Modern documentary editors, by contrast, typically spend much of their
professional lives immersed in every facet of their subject's written legacy.
They have the unique perspective of being able to view a collection of
papers as a whole, allowing those who speCialize in military documents, for
example, to consider military command not just from the standpoint of campaigns, battles, and relations among members of the high command, but also
of discipline, training, lOgistics, civil-military relations, and a host of other
day-to-day issues that are the meat of military history. This broadened
approach offers particular benefits to editors of eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury documents, since the papers of military commanders from that era
record in comparatively compact fashion not just their lives, but the lives of
the armies they led.
100
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This ability to comprehend a collection of military papers as a whole is
no mean advantage. Armies, as all military historians know, are like organisms. They function on many levels. And while what a commander decides
on the battlefield is crucial, it is important to remember that combat makes
up only a tiny, if dramatic part in the life in the army. The rest is taken up
with comparatively mundane but nonetheless critical matters such as recruitment, training, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, movement,
and supply. In twentieth- and twenty-first- century armies, responsibility for
such things spread among the thousands of individuals who made up the various echelons of support and staff. And while they left a documentary or
electronic trail, so to speak, their records are much too complex and extensive to be encompassed in any single repository. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, command was much more of a personal affair, and a
commander in chief's responsibilities, while not necessarily greater than
those of his modern equivalents, extended to every tier of his army.
George Washington is an excellent case in point. About a year and a half
ago, I completed the index for volume 13 of the Revolutionary War Series of
the Papers of George Washington, a volume that covers the heart of the Valley
Forge encampment in the early months of 1778. Now the predominant subject headings in a typical Washington Papers index are, predictably, things
like Continental Army, Continental Congress, British army, British navy,
militia, fortifications, officers, and so on. All receive their share of attention
in volume 13, but in addition I found myself accumulating endless references
to headings and subheadings like clothing: purchase and procurement, commissaries; Continental army: arrangement and organization; Continental
army: recruiting, deserters, forage, health, horses, hospitals, liquor, livestock,
loyalists, money; officers: resignations, pay, plundering and depredations,
prisoners, provisions, punishments, quartermasters, wagons; and, of course,
Washington, George: complaints of. Seemingly mundane, these sorts of
entries effectively tell the real story of what happened at Valley Forge.
Valley Forge has long been a part of the Washington mystique. The
image of ragged, barefoot, and starving soldiers shivering miserably while
the commander in chief kneels in prayer in the snow is ingrained in the
national memory. The picture is not wholly inaccurate. The soldiers were
ragged, barefoot, and starving. Yet as a documentary editor who examines
the entirety of Washington's military papers for this period will see, there was
a lot else going on too. Washington would be best represented, not kneeling
in the snow, but pacing the floors of the Isaac Potts house, dictating another

Documentary Editing 27(3) Fall200S

101

letter to Congress or a state governor, cursing Commissary General of
Purchases William Buchanan, or poring over an elaborate plan for the
reconstruction of the Continental army with a visiting Congressional committee. It was Washington's skill as an administrator and diplomat that ultimately saved the army at Valley Forge.
Historians are already familiar with the provision crisis at Valley Forge
that reached its height in February 1778. It came about not from an actual
shortage of foodstuffs in the countryside, but because of deficiencies in procurement and distribution. Loyalist or simply pragmatic civilians made good
profits selling flour and other supplies to the British in Philadelphia, but
American commissaries had a terrible time getting the farmers to sell food
for Washington's army. British hard money was understandably much more
attractive than Continental certificates or paper money. When American
agents were able to find food, they often found it impossible bring it to camp
because of the shortage of wagons, the poor roads made worse by wet
weather, and most importantly the absence or incompetence of commissaries and quartermasters. As a result the Continental army came perilously
close to dissolution. The first signs of mutiny had already appeared when
Washington launched an all-out effort to feed the army in February.
There were limits, of course, to what the commander in chief could
accomplish on his own. In the long term only Congress could enact the
needed reforms, and it was not until the appointment of Nathanael Greene
as quartermaster general in March 1778 and the onset of drier weather that
some of the most fundamental problems of transport would improve. In the
short term, however, the results of Washington's intervention were profound.
A grand forage that he ordered in February and March brought in enough
cattle and supplies to meet immediate needs. At the same time, Washington
wrote an astonishing number of letters to civilian officials, including delegates, governors, and humble commissaries, skillfully dramatizing the army's
situation and putting pressure where it was most needed in order to get the
creaky supply mechanism working. Years of experience in both the French
and Indian and Revolutionary wars had made him remarkably adept in
manipulating people-an often undervalued aspect of the military art that
demands just the right combination of flattering, complaining, soothing and
cajoling-and at Valley Forge it allowed him to get at least part of what he
wanted. There was nothing he could do with the likes of William Buchanan
or clothier general James Mease, but because of Washington's efforts their
deputies and other civil officials made the extra effort necessary to halt the
crisis.
102
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One thing Washington did not do to meet the army's supply needs was
carry out large-scale supply seizures from civilians. He may have remembered how one of his early attempts to seize horses for the Virginia Regiment
in the French and Indian War made a mob of farmers threaten to blowout
his brains, but Washington's primary reasons for avoiding confiscations were
more political. "Such procedures," he wrote the Board of War, "may relieve
for an instant-but eventually will prove of the most pernicious consequence-Besides spreading disaffection & jealousy in the people, they never
fail even in the most veteran Armies under the most rigid & exact discipline
to raise in the Soldiery a disposition to licentiousness-plunder and Robbery,
which has ever been found exceedingly difficult to suppress and which has
not only proved ruinous to the Inhabitants, but in many instances to Armies
themselves."! Unfortunately, even without confiscations Continental soldiers
and militia at Valley Forge showed an unsettling disposition to rob farmers
and plunder the countryside, although Washington tried his best to put a stop
to it. His oft-cited respect for civilian authority extended to a strong sense of
the need for his army to win, or at least not alienate, the hearts and minds of
the civilian population. It is often forgotten that Washington's military campaigns from Virginia to New York were fought in a region where a large part
of the population was pro-British, and much of the rest deeply ambivalent
about the American cause. It could have been much worse, however, and a
callous commander in chief might have provoked a popular revulsion
against the revolution that would have crippled the war effort in the midAtlantic states. Washington's policy toward civilians was sometimes harshhe was not above hanging a few traitors by way of example or wrecking mills
to prevent their supplying the British-but never punitive by eighteenth-century standards, and he largely succeeded in preventing loyalists from getting
completely out of hand.
Another of Washington's preoccupations at Valley Forge was the reform
of the army. Steuben's dramatic drilling of the Continental troops during the
winter encampment has a tendency to overshadow Washington's tireless
efforts to rebuild the very foundations of an army sapped by weak recruiting; officer resignations and disputes; poor allocation of arms, ammunition,
and manpower; and supply mismanagement. When Congress dispatched a
committee to camp in January it proVided an opportunity for the comI The Papers of George Washington. Revolutionary War Series. Volume 13, December 1777February 1778. Edited by Edward G. Lengel (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
2003), 112.
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mander in chief to layout his plans in detail. Typically, he had first asked all
of his general officers to submit written proposals for army reform, and he
eVidently considered their suggestions carefully. Nathanael Greene sent
Washington the lengthiest plan, and when the commander in chief submitted his own proposals to the committee he leaned heavily on Greene's ideas,
sometimes repeating them verbatim. Washington's letter to the camp committee on army reform, dated 29 January 1778, is one of the longest he ever
wrote-it runs twenty-eight pages in the tiny font we use for our printed volumes-and contains explicit recommendations on everything from recruiting, amalgamating infantry regiments, artillery, engineers, and a half pay and
pensionary establishment for retired officers, to military justice, hospital
reform, camp sanitation, the distribution of liquor, and conscripting slaves as
wagon drivers. In some cases, Congress waited years before adopting his
suggestions, but in the long term they had a very beneficial effect on the
army.
It is important to keep in mind that Washington administered the army
at Valley Forge almost entirely on his own. Indeed, he had no other choice,
for officer resignations were rampant. Poor pay, rank disputes, and simple
war-weariness all played their part in this, and the result was that Washington
mostly lost the support network of junior officers on which any commander
relies. His aides worked hard, but there were not enough of them. Some general officers-particularly Greene and Henry Knox-stood by Washington
throughout the winter encampment and worked hard to help, but no one
carried a heavier load than the commander in chief. A letter that Washington
wrote in February to his fellow Virginian George Weedon, who was applying for a furlough, is espeCially revealing of the pressure he felt himself to be
under:
It is matter of no small grief to me, to find such an unconquerable desire in the Officers of this Army to be absent from
Camp, as every day exhibits; and my feelings upon the occasion are not a little wounded by perceiving that this passion is
more prevalent among my country men, than in any other
Troops in the whole Army--Mulenberg is now gone--you think
it the hardest case imaginable that you are here--Woodford &
Scott are also applying--the field Officers of all your Brigades
are, in a manner, absent; a new arrangement of the army is taking place, and important changes (to effect which properly, the
aid of every officer of Rank is necessary) is on the Carpet; and
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yet, I must attempt (for it can be no more than an attempt) to
do all these duties myself, and perform the part of a Brigadier-a Colonel--&c. (because in the absence of these every thing relative to their business comes directly to me) or, I must incur
displeasure by the denial--I can see clearly that instead of having the proper Officers to assist in organizing, training, and fitting the Troops for the field against the next Campaign, that we
shall be plunged into it as we were last year heels over head
without availing ourselves of the advantages which might be
derived from our present situation & prospects, if every Officer
would lay his hands properly to the work, & afford those aids
which I have a right to expect, and the Service requires instead
of longing, & hankering after their respective homes. 2
Unimpressed, Weedon left camp anyway and resigned shortly afterwards.
Washington was and is often derided for his lack of education. His skill
as a military administrator, however, was based on intelligence, a remarkable ability to concentrate, and an eye for detail and organization. One need
only study his administrative military correspondence or one of his meticulous plans for farming at Valley Forge to see what I mean. He had his deficiencies, of course, especially on the battlefield. My purpose here is not to
resurrect the nineteenth-century view of Washington as an infallible man of
steel. At the same time, I think any reassessment of Washington the general
must take into account his efforts in the administration of an army that
threatened several times to fall completely apart. He held the army together
not through heroic virtue or his commanding personality, but through simple hard work. In this respect James Thomas Flexner was right to call him
"the indispensable man."3

*

*

*

I have used Valley Forge as an example of the kind of wider perception
that a documentary editor can bring to military history. Any documentary
editor could cite many other examples of how their work and training could
be brought to bear in the field of military history. But to get back to the question with which I began this paper: What kind of historians are we? What do
we have to do with the new social history of warfare? I think we can con2 The Papers of George Washington. Revolutionary War Series. Volume 13, December 1777February 1778. Edited by Edward G. Lengel (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
2003), 13:505-6.
3James Thomas Flexner, Washington: The Indispensable Man (Boston, MA: Little Brown,
1974).
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tribute at many levels. One is to undertake comparatively small projects by
editing the letters and diaries of private soldiers, nurses, civilians in wartime,
and others. An amazing amount of this material still languishes unread in
archives. Bringing it into the open through print or electronic publication is
a truly noble task, and besides, research into the behavior of men and
women in battle is one of the most fascinating and dynamic activities in military history today. Another way we can contribute to the new military history is to examine the papers of great military leaders, but with a twist,
looking beyond their conduct in battle to see what role they played in the
military organism as a whole.
Above all, we must remember that as documentary editors and military
historians we have not just the ability but the duty to contribute to our field
with scholarship that goes beyond mere editing. Already, I can hear two
words coming: Julian Boyd. The last thing we need, or so goes the established wisdom, is for documentary editors to get uppity like Boyd and try to
be scholars too. Who needs more of those scandalously long footnotes?
Editors should concentrate on transcribing documents and leave interpretation to their betters! Once an admired historian, Boyd has become a bugbear
that elder editors use to frighten their restive children. "Mommy, can I edit
and write a book too?" squeaks a junior documentary editor oppressed by
years of backbreaking tedium. "You wouldn't want the ghost of Julian Boyd
to snatch you, would you dear?" comes the reply. "Now get back to your volume."
Take it from me:Julian Boyd is dead and buried. And at the risk of provoking a haunting I further dare to avow that his ghost doesn't exist.
Whatever convention says, there is absolutely no reason why documentary
editors should not seek and receive the time necessary to put their unique
skills at the service of the historical profession. This need not mean multipage footnotes; rather, every editor should be given leave-sabbaticals, if
necessary-to write articles and monographs based on knowledge and skills
gained through documentary editing. What better way to make our profession more rewarding and relevant in the twenty-first century? While we may
not all be skilled writers-as I fear many will discover from my own booksdocumentary editors can indeed be historians, and have fun, too.
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